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Abstract
We develop, and experimentally test, models of informal agree-
ments. Agents are assumed to be honest but su¤er costs of overcoming
temptations. We extend two classical bargaining solutions split-the-
di¤erence and deal-me-out to this informal agreement setting. For
each solution there are two natural ways to do this, leaving us with
22 models to explore. In the experiment, a temptations-constrained
version of deal-me-out emerges as the clear winner.
1 Introduction
Traditional bargaining theory, e.g., Nash (1950, 1953), focuses on binding
contracts. Much less attention has been given to informal (non-binding)
agreements. A likely reason is that if people maximize own income, a com-
mon assumption, then there is limited scope for informal agreements to have
impact.1 A selsh agent would simply renege if this were in his interest.
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1Informal agreements may allow Pareto improvements in games with multiple equilib-
ria; see e.g., MacLeod & Malcolmson (1989), McCutcheon (1997), Levin (2003).
Humans have tendencies that curb such opportunism. Successful entre-
preneur Karl Eller, for example, wrote his book Integrity Is All Youve Got
(2005) in which that message is clear. One can justify honesty with reference
to repetition or reputation, but that cannot be the whole story. Eller writes
about the happiness that comes with knowing youll never be ashamed to
face yourself in the mirror(p. 103). Indeed, experiments indicate that hon-
esty matters even in non-repeat settings with anonymity guaranteed. For
example, Malhotra & Murnighan (2002), Irlenbusch (2004), Ben-Ner & Put-
terman (2009), and Kessler & Leider (2012) nd that subjects who were
o¤ered an opportunity to enter an informal agreement often did so and then
delivered although they could have protably reneged.2
Honest individuals have much to gain by striking informal agreements.
Binding contracts may be infeasible (e.g., in developing countries with unre-
liable courts), illegal (e.g., for cartelists), or costly (e.g., nuptials). This begs
questions regarding the shape and impact of informal agreements when hon-
est folks interact. We develop, and then experimentally test, relevant theory.
Throughout, we assume that individuals are completely honest in the sense
that once they have struck an agreement they never renege. This is stark but
once honesty is acknowledged to a degree, understanding the implications of
complete honesty seems like a natural benchmark, so we start there.
For a variety of psychological reasons (discussed in section 2.2) honesty
may (one way or another) be driven by psychic costs associated with breaking
a promise or reneging. Such costs can only be incurred if the post-agreement
behavior slips o¤-the-agreement-path. For honest individuals, this ensures
adherence. Because the cost is counterfactual (never occurring) there is little
reason to think its magnitude would a¤ect how lucrative an informal agree-
ment seems to an honest party. It is thus natural to wonder whether honesty
2We view informal agreements, which involve a form of consensus, as conceptually
distinct from promises, which may be unilateral. Several studies relatedly document a
preference to keep ones word, e.g., Kerr & Kau¤man-Gilliland (1994), Ellingsen & Jo-
hannesson (2004), Gneezy (2005), Charness & Dufwenberg (2006), Vanberg (2008), and
Servátka, Tucker & Vadoviµc (2011).
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implies that informal agreements work just like binding contracts.
A key insight of our analysis is that this is not necessarily the case. A
binding contract di¤ers from an informal agreement in that the latter involves
materially protable post-agreement reneging opportunities. Much evidence
suggests that people generally struggle with resisting temptations.3 Although
an honest person fullls the terms he agrees to, he need not be immune to
the costs incurred when overcoming temptations to renege. We think of
honest persons as having ashes of temptation such that they temporarily
consider disregarding the o¤-path reneging costs and indulging the luring
opportunistic gains that loom, even if ultimately the o¤-path costs win them
over so that they never renege. These temptations occur on-the-agreement-
path and a¤ect the evaluation of informal agreements, including which ones
are worth striking. This e¤ect has no counterpart if a binding contract is
considered, because binding contracts come with explicit material, rather
than psychological and for a tempted party possibly oblivious, sanctions that
make reneging not seem tempting.
We work with the following framework: (i) an informal agreement may
be reached by two players about to play what we will call an underlying
game;(ii) the object of negotiation concerns which strategy prole to play;
(iii) whether or not an informal agreement is in place, no material sanctions
punish o¤-path play. We extend two classical bargaining solutions split-
the-di¤erence and deal-me-out to this setting. With temptation costs in
the picture, there are two seemingly natural ways to do this; beyond a¤ect-
ing participation constraints, temptation costs may or may not a¤ect the
predicted deals themselves. This leaves us with 22 models to explore. Our
experiment may be seen as a horse race between these models.
Anchoring our analysis on an underlying game allows us to be explicit
about the nature of the economic situation in which a deal is struck, and it
3See Benartzi & Thaler (2004), Brown, Chua & Camerer (2009), and Martinsson,
Myrseth & Wollbrant (2012) for experiments, Thaler & Shefrin (1981), Gul & Pesendor-
fer (2001), Loewenstein & ODonoghue (2005), Fudenberg & Levine (2006, 2011, 2012),
Ozdenoren, Salant & Silverman (2012), and Lipman & Pesendorfer (2011) for theory.
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allows informal agreements to be truly non-binding since post-agreement that
game must still be played. The underlying game does not describe the hag-
gling process. Agreement-formation is instead captured implicitly, through
a solution-concept and predictions are formulated in terms of restrictions on
strategies that players agree on. Although we focus on informal agreements,
as will be seen later the approach is not limited to such contexts; it allows
for analyzing and comparing binding contracts as well.
Our paper shares the focus on informal agreements in underlying game
with the pioneering work by Miettinen (2006, 2013). He examines which
deals players will honor if they have costs of breaking agreements (and
he derives results that hinge on whether or not actions are strategic com-
plements. Miettinen thus takes exogenously given informal agreements and
asks if they will be honored, whereas we assume that informal agreements
are honored and then o¤er theories that endogenize their shape.
Our contribution has two parts. #1 is formulating theory. #2 is testing
that theory in an experiment. Sections 2, 3, and 4 present, respectively,
theory, experiment, and concluding remarks including suggestions for follow-
up research.
2 Theory
2.1 General framework
Our starting point is a two-player extensive game (form)   with dollar payo¤s
specied at end nodes. Let Si be player is set of strategies (taken to be
singleton if i owns no information set), and S = S1 S2. Let mi : S ! R be
is (dollar) payo¤-from-strategy-prole function, derived from  .
This underlying game   describes the strategic structure of a situation
where two persons just met and face opportunities of collaboration for mutual
gain. Assume that   is a multi-stage game form with observed actions (in-
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cluding at endnodes),4 so that all instances of imperfect information concern
simultaneous choices. This simplies the key denitions below by allowing us
to refer to subgames in a useful way, without essentially compromising scope
since most applied and experimental work is concerned with such games. The
payo¤s represent dollar increments relative to whatever wealth the players
had before; a payo¤ of 0 means that a players overall dollar wealth remains
the same as if he had never met the other player.
Many economic situations involve payments so it is natural to consider
underlying games reecting that. For example, let H > 0 be the highest
sum of the playerspayo¤s at any endnode. The games we focus on have the
property that if $1; $2  0 and $1+$2 = H then   admits some endnode with
payo¤s ($1; $2), thus allowing ways to equalize gains. However, it is not incon-
ceivable that an economic situation somehow signicantly constrains players
transfer opportunities away from allowing equal splits. Our denitions are
intended to apply regardless and therefore stated without presumptions of
transfer possibilities.
We envision the players as haggling over which strategy prole in   to
play.   itself does not describe this process which is rather captured via
a solution concept with a special structure: We select a triple of strategy
proles a; b; c 2 S such that a is the agreement, b is the behavior following
the agreement, and c is what counterfactually would have happened if nego-
tiations stranded. Predictions are formulated as restrictions on a; b; and c.
Before we describe these, several clarifying comments are warranted:
First, since a; b; c 2 S are strategy proles they describe o¤-path play
which we interpret as reecting the playersagreed upon understanding (pre-
sumably obtained through the haggling process or social norms) of what
would happen following any deviation.5 Second, we theorize only about what
4See, e.g., Fudenberg & Tirole (1991), chapter 3. The assumption of perfect information
across end nodes is important for our upcoming comparison between informal agreements
and binding contract; see section 2.3.
5One could imagine alternatives, e.g., as in a self-conrming equilibrium (Fudenberg
& Levine 1993; cf. Greenberg 2000).
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happens when negotiations generate agreements; c describes what would have
happened had a not occurred, given that a does occur. It is possible that
in some game no triple (a; b; c) exists that satises the postulated proper-
ties. The interpretation is that no agreement would be reached in that case.
We o¤er no explicit prediction for play following such non-counterfactual
negotiation-breakdown. Third, one could imagine a richer structure where c
depends on how negotiations stranded (e.g., which player caused the break
down). We abstract away from such nuances.
Fourth, we elucidate why we do not explicitly model the strategic struc-
ture of pre-play negotiation. Consider Figure 1, which comes with a story:
Figure 1: Hospital-doctor game
Player 1 is a hospital and player 2 an employed doctor. At the
root 1 decides whether to Invest or Not invest in costly training
for 2 to learn a new radiography technique. In the former case 2
becomes more productive but also more attractive to other hospi-
tals; choice Leave with subsequent payo¤s reects what happens
6
if 2 resigns and takes employment at Johns Hopkins. That would
be bad for 1 who stands to gain if 2 instead Continues at the
current job, in which case 1 can choose what wage w 2 [0; 3] to
pay 2,6 thereby a¤ecting 2s life-time income.
This description is meant to appear somewhat realistic, yet it is overly
barren as it incorporates no opportunities for haggling, promises, threats,
etc. A more meaningful account might incorporate how the players meet
and discuss whether 1 should pay for the training and what 2s pension
should be. How should one model such considerations? One possibility is to
modify the game, to include counter-o¤ers, promises, threats, handshakes,
signatures, etc., as explicit choices in a larger game. But such a game is
likely to be unwieldy. It may be intractable to apply a solution concept. It
is against this backdrop that we formulate our approach.
This connects us to some classics. Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944)
approach all games other than two-player zero-sum ones with this outlook
(see e.g., pp. 223-4). Nash (1953) assumes players strike binding contracts
regarding how to play an underlying game, and before negotiations start
they announce threatsan umpireforces them to implement if they sub-
sequently fail to reach an agreement.7 We share the outlook that strategy
proles are objects of negotiation, but neither limit attention to binding con-
tracts nor presuppose access to an umpire.8
6The implicit assumption is that later in 2s life he has fewer outside opportunities and
is therefore vulnerable to hold-up.
7See Kalai (1977) and Kalai & Tauman Kalai (2010) for more work in this vein.
8The cheap talk literature (e.g.. Crawford & Sobel 1982, Farrell & Rabin 1996) also
studies the e¤ect of communication in games. Unlike our approach, cheap talk is mod-
eled as explicit choices and, most importantly, presumed not to a¤ect preferences (over
strategy proles) in the underlying game. In our approach players have a preference for
playing as they agree, so talk is not cheap. There is also the game-theoretic literature on
communication equilibria (e.g., Forges 1986, Myerson 1986), which (like us) captures the
e¤ect of messages through solution concepts but (like the cheap talk literature) assumes
communication does not a¤ect preferences over strategy proles.
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2.2 Specic Predictions
What psychological and economic principles determine the shape of a; b; c 2
S? The framework of section 2.1 is useful for formulating answers. We de-
velop four specic models that, apart from assuming honesty and temptation
costs, connect closely to classical bargaining scholarship. These models di¤er
on the specication of a but share a common specication of b and c. We
start with the latter two.
As regards c, counterfactual post-negotiation-breakdown play, we make
Assumption 1: c is a subgame perfect equilibrium of   using (mi)i=1;2.
This modeling choice is a compromise. On the one hand, many studies
show that players often act pro-socially. In many games (e.g., prisoners
dilemma, public goods, or trust games) that exhibit a tension between indi-
vidual and collective dollar-payo¤-maximization, subjects manage to reach
e¢ cient outcomes,9 suggesting that they appreciate collective well-being. On
the other hand, it seems likely that players who do not manage to agree would
end up being irritated with one another. Our assumption of selsh behavior
takes a middle road.10
Next consider b, behavior following an informal agreement. Our assump-
tion, key to everything to follow, is that players honor their agreements:
Assumption 2: b = a.
If an informal agreement a = (ai)i=1;2 2 S is struck, then each i sub-
sequently chooses bi = ai. Such honesty may have multiple psychological
foundations, like a preference to keep promises or (more generally) not to
have lied (e.g., Gneezy 2005, Demichelis & Weibull 2008, Vanberg 2008,
Kartik 2009), obeying some social norm that one should honor agreements
9For surveys of the evidence, see e.g., Camerer (2003) or Fehr & Schmidt (2002).
10Note that there is scant evidence to guide our modeling choice: existing data on the
relevance of social preferences typically concerns play after neither actual nor counterfac-
tual negotiation breakdown.
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(e.g., Malhotra & Murnighan 2002, Miettinen 2006 and 2013, Kessler & Lei-
der 2012), or guilt aversion (e.g., Charness & Dufwenberg 2006, Battigalli &
Dufwenberg 2007) such that they live up to othersexpectations as shaped
through negotiations. One may additionally conceive ways to back up hon-
esty via reciprocity (e.g., Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk
& Fischbacher 2006, Cox, Friedman & Sadiraj 2008), concerns of identity
(e.g., Akerlof & Kranton 2000), or maintenance of self-esteem (e.g., Benabou
& Tirole 2002). In principle it is of interest which story is more empirically
relevant, but in this paper we do not aim to unpack the psycho-foundations
of honesty. We simply assume that agreements are honored.
Next we turn to a, the informal agreement itself. Unlike binding con-
tracts, which are enforced by explicit material sanctions, adherence to an
informal agreement needs support by psychological costs of reneging. To an
honest person, such cognitive costs are su¢ ciently large to prevent reneg-
ing. Since they occur o¤-path (as reneging never happens) arguably they
shouldnt a¤ect how attractive a deal seems at the point of agreement. How-
ever, another subtle di¤erence between binding contracts and informal agree-
ments may occur on-path, post-agreement. With an informal agreement a
party may face materially lucrative opportunities to renege, which may be
tempting if a player temporarily disregards the psychological o¤-path reneg-
ing costs and instead focuses on the opportunistic gain available. We propose
that even players who are honest, in the sense that the o¤-path costs ulti-
mately win them over such that they do not reneg, experience ashes of such
temptations. There is a sizable literature on human tendency to resist temp-
tations.11 It is often argued that humans can overcome temptation, but that
this comes at a cost. If honest player i considers such costs when evaluating
an informal agreement, then his subjective gain (i.e., net of the temptation
11See the references in footnote 3. The literature focuses on single decision maker set-
tings (Loewenstein & ODonoghues section VI is an exception), not temptation to renege
and hurt a co-player, but that extension seems plausible to us. Indeed, Martinsson et al.
reports support for the proposition that individuals may experience a self-control conict
between the temptation to act selshly and the better judgment to act pro-socially.
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cost) under an informal agreement will be lower than with the same strategy
prole as a binding contract. These considerations may a¤ect the shape of
the agreement. If the temptation costs are big enough, they may even make
i accept a 2 S as a binding contract but not as an informal agreement.
How should one calculate costs of overcoming temptation? Are they linear
or perhaps convex in how much a player may gain (cf. Fudenberg & Levine
2006, 2011, 2012)? Are they stochastic (cf. Dekel & Lipman 2012)? Do
they depend on how many times a player is tempted (cf. Salant, Silverman
& Ozdenoren 2012), or only on the maximum temptation along the path?
Are they moderated if reneging hurts others (cf. Gneezy 2005), or via some
notion of empathy(Loewenstein & ODonoghue 2005)? The answers are
not obvious. We work with the following formulation. Given an informal
agreement a = (ai; aj) 2 S, is cost of overcoming a temptation associated
with a is a real-valued, continuous, strictly increasing, weakly convex function
i : S ! R+ dened by i(max
si2Si
mi(si; aj) mi(a)) such that i(0) = 0.
Drawing on i, we now dene three concepts which are key components
and which stay constant across all versions of our third assumption:
Three denitions:
a0 2 S allows strict gains if [mi(a0) i(a0)] mi(c) > 0 for i = 1; 2.
a0 2 S is e¢ cient if there exists no a00 2 S such that [mi(a00)  
i(a
00)] mi(c) > [mi(a0)  i(a0)] mi(c) for i = 1; 2.
a0 2 S is c-based if o¤-its-path a0 species the same choices as c.
To understand strict gains, note thatmi(a) i(a) is the value of the deal
net of temptation cost whilemi(c) is the value of the forgone opportunity. The
di¤erence [mi(a0)  i(a0)] mi(c) may be interpreted as is subjective gain-
from-trade, which we shall require to be strict since it seems plausible that
people agree only to deals where they improve. The e¢ ciency requirement
is analogous to what is typically assumed in theories of binding contracts,
and seems equally plausible in our context. The c-based requirement is an
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assumption about how the play proceeds after a player reneges. The motiva-
tion is analogous to what we proposed for c (including that c is independent
of how negotiations stranded or the nature of reneging).
With this in place we state four competing versions of our third and nal
assumption. Each predicts that a particular equal split of something valuable
will occur, if this is possible while respecting strict gains, e¢ ciency, and being
c-based. The versions di¤er on exactly what is being split. We draw on
classical bargaining scholarship and extend two models to our setting: split-
the-di¤erence and deal-me-out. Under the former the value split is measured
relative to the parties threat pointsmi(c) for each i.12 Under the latter
the value is measured without regard to mi(c).13 We consider versions where
the value split reects, or does not reect, temptation costs.
We will o¤er further comments, but doing so is easier if we can refer to
the denitions. These are (with ESIP mnemonic for equal-split-if-possible):
Assumption 3 version (i): a 2 S allows strict gains, is e¢ cient,
and is c-based. Moreover, it satises the following ESIP(i) condition:
Let E(i) be a set of all a0 2 S that allow strict gains, are e¢ cient, are
c-based, and satisfy [mi(a0) i(a0)] mi(c) = [mj(a0) j(a0)] mj(c)
for i; j = 1; 2. If E(i) is nonempty, then a 2 E(i).
Assumption 3 version (ii): a 2 S allows strict gains, is e¢ cient,
and is c-based. Moreover, it satises the following ESIP(ii) condition:
Let E(ii) be a set of all a0 2 S that allow strict gains, are e¢ cient, are
c-based, and satisfy mi(a0)   i(a0) = mj(a0)   j(a0) for i; j = 1; 2. If
E(ii) is nonempty, then a 2 E(ii).
12When selsh, risk-neutral players divide money, a number of bargaining solutions
make the same prediction as split-the-di¤erence, including the Nash (1950) and Kalai &
Smorodinsky (1975) solutions.
13Several experiments tested split-the-di¤erence vs. deal-me-out models in various bar-
gaining scenarios (e.g., Ho¤man & Spitzer 1982, Binmore, Proulx, Samuelson & Swierzbin-
ski 1998, Feltovich & Swierzbinski 2011, Anbarci & Feltovich 2013). It seems subjects are
largely less sensitive to nonbinding disagreement outcomes than predicted by split-the-
di¤erence. In many instances they simply split the pie down-the-middle.
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Assumption 3 version (iii): a 2 S allows strict gains, is e¢ cient,
and is c-based. Moreover, it satises the following ESIP(iii) condition:
Let E(iii) be a set of all a0 2 S that allow strict gains, are e¢ cient, are
c-based, and satisfy mi(a0)  mi(c) = mj(a0)  mj(c) for i; j = 1; 2. If
E(iii) is nonempty, then a 2 E(iii).
Assumption 3 version (iv): a 2 S allows strict gains, is e¢ cient,
and is c-based. Moreover, it satises the following ESIP(iv) condition:
Let E(iv) be a set of all a0 2 S that allow strict gains, are e¢ cient, are
c-based, and satisfymi(a0) = mj(a0) for i; j = 1; 2. If E(iv) is nonempty,
then a 2 E(iv).
These solutions depend on the is, as if those functions were known. In
bargaining theory, assuming players to have common knowledge of features
of one anothers preferences (e.g., discount rates) is not unusual. How com-
pelling is it to extend the idea to temptation costs? The assumption may
be plausible for people who know each other very well. But perhaps more
importantly, since our players are honest, it seems reasonable to assume that
they do not pretend to have di¤erent i.
Our denitions reect two distinct ways to operationalize that idea. As-
sumption 3 versions (i) & (ii) involve default deals that factor in temptation
costs directly. During the course of negotiations playerso¤ers and actions
reveal their is to one another! This is stark. Sticking to an agreement may
be one thing, revealing private information quite another.14 Nevertheless, the
assumption is consistent with (extreme) honesty, a testable benchmark worth
considering. Assumption 3 versions (iii) & (iv), by contrast, involve default
deals that refer to material rewards only (again, with or without mi(c) in
the picture). Temptation costs now matter only through the strict gains and
e¢ ciency conditions. Players merely say yesor noto the default deals
as given by ESIP(iii) or ESIP(iv).
14In addition, in line with Loewensteins (1996) contention that people underestimate
the impact of visceral factors on their own future behavior(his Proposition 5), we note
that assuming that i knows i is not entirely innocuous.
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For many underlying games, if the default scenario with equal-gains/shares
obtains, the prediction is unique. However, if equal-gains/shares is incompat-
ible with strict gains, e¢ ciency, and being c-based, then any deal that satises
the latter three restrictions may obtain.15 Existence is not guaranteed, as
it may be impossible to satisfy those requirements. If the temptations that
weigh on the players become very strong, both may demand compensation
(relative to equal-gains/shares) beyond whats feasible. We illustrate these
possibilities in section 3.
2.3 Binding Contracts
Our main interest concerns informal agreements but our framework admits
the case of binding contracts as a modied case. To cover that, assume that,
independent of whether a party is honest, deals are honored because high
explicit sanctions would punish breach of contract. Players are then not
tempted to renege. Hence, binding contracts may be studied by applying
Assumptions 1, 2, and 3(), under the new assumption that i(s) = 0 for all
s 2 S, i 2 N .
This interpretation presumes there are no issues of moral hazard, such
that some choices would be non-veriable to a contracting party (or a court)
and a binding contract regulating that choice infeasible. This is justied
through our assumption of observed actions (also at endnodes; cf. section
2.1). A large contract-theoretic literature explores moral hazard see e.g.,
Bolton & Dewatripont (2005) for an entry. We restrict attention to under-
lying games where the issue is irrelevant, in order to highlight di¤erences
between informal agreements and binding contracts other than feasibility.
15This di¤ers from Binmore et al. (1989), where a departure from the equal split gives
a constrained player exactly what makes him indi¤erent between agreeing or not, hence
the solution is unique but there is no strict gain which we nd unintuitive.
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3 An Experiment
We proposed four extensions of classical bargaining theory to informal agree-
ments. Are they empirically relevant? We designed an experiment to shed
light on the issue.
3.1 Experimental Games and Predictions
We use the lost wallet game (Dufwenberg & Gneezy 2000), presented in Fig-
ure 2, where d 2 f0; 5g is a parameter which varies by treatment. The game
presents several advantages: It is easy to explain to subjects and implement,
yet rich enough to allow a deal with equal payo¤s. The theory generates
sharp comparative statics predictions across our four treatments (discussed
shortly). As regards c 2 S, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
using (mi)i=1;2, namely (s1; s2) = (s1; x) = (Out; 30). Our solutions predict
that only player B may face a temptation to renege, which simplies the
analysis (relative to, say, the hospital-doctor game of section 2.1).
Figure 2: The lost wallet game
The assumptions of section 2.2 imply that c = (Out; 30) and b = a, but
rule out a = (Out; x) for any x. Too see this, note that the prole is not
c-based unless x = 30, in which case strict gains fails for A. Consider instead
14
a = (In; x). Strict gains for A implies (30   x)   A(a)   (10   d) > 0
implying (30  x) > (10  d) implying A(a) = 0. For B, strict gains implies
that x  B(30  x)  d > 0. Combining inequalities, we get the strict-gains
constraint : 20 + d > x > d+ B(30  x).
Next consider Assumption 3. Under 3(i), ESIP(i) implies that if possible
x = x(i) satises (30   x(i))   0   (10   d) = x(i)   B(30   x(i))   d, or
equivalently x(i) = 10 + d + 1
2
B(30   x(i)). Under 3(ii), ESIP(ii) implies
that if possible x = x(ii) satises (30   x(ii))   0 = x(ii)   B(30   x(ii)),
or equivalently x(ii) = 15 + 1
2
B(30   x(ii)). Since B is strictly increasing
and continuous each of the two equations has a unique solution. However,
in each case, the solution is not guaranteed to always satisfy the strict-gains
constraint. If it is satised, then the corresponding set E(j), j 2 fi; iig,
is nonempty and we have found our solution: agreement a = (In; x(j)).16
Otherwise, E(j) is empty. Then, using the strict-gains constraint, we get a
solution set: fx j 20 + d > x > d + B(30   x)g. If B is so steep that
B(30 x)  20 for all x < 20+d then this set is also empty, illustrating the
potential for non-existence.17 Otherwise, all the elements are c-based and
e¢ cient, so all the corresponding a = (In; x) satisfy our assumptions.
Now move to assumptions 3(iii) and 3(iv). ESIP(iii) implies that if pos-
sible x = x(iii) satises (30   x(iii))   (10   d) = x(iii)   d, or x(iii) = 10;
ESIP(iv) implies that if possible x = x(iv) satises (30   x(iv)) = x(iv), or
x(iv) = 15. Claims that follow are parallel to those in the preceding para-
graph. If any of the solutions satises the strict-gains constraint, then the
corresponding set E(j), j 2 fiii; ivg, is nonempty and we have found our
solution: agreement a = (In; x(j)). Otherwise, all elements of the solution
set fx j 20 + d > x > d+ B(30  x)g are informal agreements; or, if the set
is empty, there is no agreement.
For binding contracts, A and B agree on a; b; c 2 S according to the
16It is easy to verify that a is c-based and e¢ cient.
17Reect on the intuition: B is so easily tempted that the compensation he craves,
relative to equal-split-of-gains, is incompatible with strict gains for A.
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assumptions of section 2.3. ESIP(i) and ESIP(ii) collapse to ESIP(iii) and
ESIP(iv), respectively. Moreover, the binding contract version of the strict-
gains constraint 20 + d > x(j) > d always holds (j 2 fi; ii; iii; ivg).
The following tables summarize the predictions for the cases when the
agreement exists. An agreement always involves A choosing In. B keeps an
amount x that corresponds to the appropriate case as shown.
Table 1: Predictions: x
Binding contract (BC): x(j) =
Asmpt. 3: (j) = (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
d = 0 10 15 10 15
d = 5 15 15 15 15
Informal agreement (IA): E(j) is nonempty, x(j) =
Asmpt. 3: (j) = (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
d = 0 10 + B(30  x(i))=2 15 + B(30  x(ii))=2 10 15
d = 5 15 + B(30  x(i))=2 15 + B(30  x(ii))=2 15 15
Informal agreement (IA): E(j) is empty, x(j) 2
Asmpt. 3: (j) = (i) & (ii) & (iii) & (iv)
d = 0 (B(30  x(j)); 20)
d = 5 (5 + B(30  x(j)); 25)
The experiment uses a 2 2 between-subjects design that closely follows
the discussion above.18 Between treatments we varied payo¤ parameter d 2
f0; 5g and whether the agreement was informal (IA) or a binding contract
(BC). The four treatments are labeled: BC-0, BC-5, IA-0, and IA-5. At a
18We restricted x to be a whole $-amounts: x 2 f0; 1; :::; 30g. There is some issue when
the predicted x is not an integer, but any ner scale for x would not x that and bring
more complexity to the experiment. The theory of section 3 is thus taken to make an
approximate prediction for our nely discretized lab implementation.
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later date we added two control treatments NN-0 and NN-5 that involved no
pre-play negotiations.19
For binding contracts we obtain point predictions. Each pair of subjects
agrees that A chooses In and B keeps the amount as specied in the top
panel of Table 1. For informal agreements the predictions are summarized
in the middle and the lower panels of Table 1. Again, every agreement
involves A choosing In. However, the distribution of xs will depend on the
(unobservable) distribution of Bs in the subject population. To keep the
discussion organized we separately discuss two cases: one, where B is rather
at so that predictions are contained within the middle panel of Table 1, and
another, in which B is su¢ ciently steep so that the predictions fall within
the lower panel of the table.
First, consider that case when B is not very steep. According to As-
sumption 3(i) xs will be distributed on the support bounded by 10 and 20 in
the IA-0 and by 15 and 25 in the IA-5 treatment. Moreover, the distribution
in IA-5 should stochastically dominate that in IA-0. This follows directly
from comparing the two rows (d = 0 vs. d = 5) in Assumption 3(i) of the
middle portion of Table 1. Under Assumption 3(ii) the distribution in IA-0
is bounded by 15 and 20 in IA-0 and by 15 and 25 in IA-5. Where the two
supports overlap (on 15 to 20) the conditional distributions should be the
same. This is clear from the column two of the middle panel of Table 1. The
remaining two versions of the Assumption 3, 3(iii) and 3(iv), make exact
point predictions, so we should observe data concentrated on the values as
shown in the table.
The second case refers to a B that is su¢ ciently steep that the equal-
split-of-gains is incompatible with strict gains, but not too steep as otherwise
no agreement would be feasible. In this case the prediction is set-valued: A
and B are predicted to agree on some x belonging to the set given in the
19The role of these treatments is not in testing our theory of how agreements form but
rather in evaluating the impact of agreements on eventual outcomes. The discussion of
the data from these treatments is deferred until section 3.4.
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bottom panel of Table 1. From the table it is clear that as we move from
IA-5 to IA-0 the boundaries shift to the right (by 5). Hence, the strict-gains
constraint is more likely to bind in IA-5 than IA-0. This has identiable
implications for the theory under Assumptions 3(iii) and 3(iv). Notice that
in these two cases the theory makes point predictions unless (some) subjects
have high enough Bs. For these instances we expect the agreed on xs to
compensate (favor) players B.
Finally, if the subjects B is so steep that the if-equal-split-not-possible
set is empty, then there is simply no room for players to agree. This would
happen when B(30   x) < 20 for all x < 20 + d. Since the condition is
tighter in the d = 0 case, if there are any disagreements we would expect
them to be more likely in IA-0 than in IA-5.
3.2 Procedures
The experiment was computerized and conducted at the University of Ari-
zonas Economic Science Laboratory. The software was written in Visual
Basic 6. In total, 308 undergraduate students participated as subjects. The
sessions and participation is summarized in Table 9 in Appendix A. Subjects
played one game no repetitions and were then privately paid. The average
nal payment was $19.17, including a $5 show-up fee. On average, sessions
lasted about 50 minutes.20
Once all subjects were seated at computer terminals separated by pri-
vacy dividers, hard copies of instructions were handed out (see Appendix
B) and subjects were given 10-15 minutes to read them. When everyone
had nished reading, the instructions were also read out loud. After this,
the experimenters answered any questions individually. The software then
started up with a set of comprehension questions. Every subject had to get
all answers correct before the experiment proceeded further.
Our theory presumes pre-play negotiation but leaves the strategic details
20This is from the time of arrival until the last subject was paid out and left. The actual
experiment (reading instructions, decisions and questionnaire) took about 30 minutes.
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of this process implicit, reected only through the solution concept. In the
lab, however, one has to o¤er some specic format for the haggling. We chose
an alternating-o¤er structure. After being acquainted with game details,
and learning their respective roles as player A or B, subjects could send
proposals back and forth and agree on how to play. One person from each
pair was randomly selected to make an opening proposal. Each proposal
specied whether player A would choose In or Out, and, conditional on In,
the amount that player B would keep. The party who received a proposal
could accept it, make a counter-proposal, or disagree and quit negotiating.
Acceptance of a proposal led to an agreement. This ended the negotiations
and a message saying either Player A chooses OUT or, e.g., Player A
chooses IN and Player B keeps $18 and gives $12 to Player A appeared
on the pairs computer screens. A counter-proposal reversed the negotiation
roles while a disagreement terminated the negotiation process. There was no
limit imposed on the length of negotiations or on the time within which a
subject had to submit his decision.
3.3 Main Results
In what follows y is the agreed-upon x, z is the post-agreement choice of x.
Table 2 presents raw data on negotiated agreements and paths of play.21 In
the IA-treatments, the agreement/path of play is described by the amount
for player B (= y; z), implying that A chooses In, or by indicating that the
choice for A is Out (and hence that B had no decision to make). In the
BC-treatments, z = y by denition/design.
Agreement formation
Table 2 shows that apart from two cases in BC-5 all other pairs of subjects
reached an agreement. All BCs involved player A choosing In. In the IA-
treatments 100% of our subject-pairs formed an agreement. From the vantage
21Appendix A contains more complete descriptive statistics.
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Table 2: Raw data on agreements and path of play
IA-0 IA-5 BC-0 BC-5 NN-0 NN-5
y z y z y = z y = z z z
0 15 15 15 14 14 15 15
10 20 15 15 15 15 15 15
13 18 15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 20
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 20
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 20
15 15 15 15 15 15 19 20
15 15 15 15 15 15 20 20
15 15 15 16 15 15 20 20
15 15 15 17 15 15 23 20
15 15 15 25 15 15 28 20
15 15 15 20 15 15 30 21
15 15 15 30 15 15 30 25
15 15 15 30 15 15 30 25
15 15 15 30 15 15 Out 25
15 15 16 16 15 15 Out 25
15 15 16 20 15 15 Out 30
15 20 17 15 15 15 Out 30
15 30 18 18 15 16 Out 30
15 30 18 18 15 17 Out 30
15 Out 20 20 20 20 Out Out
20 20 20 Out Out
24 22 Disagr. Out
Out 15 Disagr.
Note: y refers to the agreed-upon amount that player B would keep and
z to the amount B actually kept. Observations that di¤er from 15 are
italicized. In BC-5 following the disagreement both player A chose In
and their matched player B chose to keep 20 and 30 respectively.
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Table 3: Agreements and honesty
Treat. Obs. Agr. Player A Player B
Agreed to In Chose In z < y z = y z > y
IA-0 24 24 24 23 0 17 6
IA-5 27 27 26 27 2 16 8
BC-0 24 24 24 24
BC-5 27 25 25 25
Note: In IA-5 one pair has agreed on player A choosing Out. Following this player A
chose In and player B kept 15.
point of the theory, this would suggest that the subjectsBs are not high
enough to induce disagreements. All but one agreement involved player A
choosing In.22 These patterns can, largely, be accommodated by all models.
Do players honor agreements?
Table 3, distilled from Table 2, provides a summary of reached agreements
and subsequent behavior. The rst column, Obs, denotes the number of
subject pairs who participated in a given treatment. The second column,
Agr, provides the count of reached agreements which we further split (in
subsequent columns) into what these agreements prescribe that players A
and B do. For As we compare the number of subjects who agreed on In
(see column Agreed to In) with those who agreed and chose In (column
Chose In). For example, in IA-0, twenty-four As agreed to choose In
and twenty-three of them subsequently honored that agreement. In IA-5 all
twenty-six As agreed and chose In.23 Finally, in the rightmost part of the
table we list the number of Bs for whom the amount kept (z) was smaller
than, equal, or greater than the agreed upon amount (y).24
22One pair in IA-5 agreed on Out, then A chose In and B kept 15.
23Observation 27 involves the subjects who agreed on Out, then chose In and 15.
24In the BC-treatments, presented in the two bottom rows, by denition there is no
variation between the agreement and the observed behavior of either player.
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Table 3 shows that a majority of agreements were honored. In all cases
where A agreed to choose In, that choice was subsequently made. Bs,
unlike As, cost themselves a lot of money (usually $15) by not reneging.
Nevertheless, the proportion of Bs who honor the agreement is rather high.
In IA-0 74% of Bs did exactly what they agreed to. In IA-5 this proportion
was slightly lower at 64%. Out of the sixteen subjects who reneged (about
10% of Bs), ve kept everything (31% of those who reneged) while the
remaining eleven gave their paired player As a non-zero amount.25 While
our assumption of honesty does not garner universal support, it approximates
the data reasonably well.
Equal splits & compensated deals: do temptation costs matter?
As regards agreements formation and honesty, the aspects of the data
discussed so far match up with the theory rather well. In this section we
proceed to test the implications of the various versions of Assumption 3 on
the distribution of ys across treatments, performing several associated tests.
Table 4 presents the data in the condensed form. In all treatments we
nd substantial concentrations of observations on equal splits (y = 15). It is
useful to categorize the data with respect to equal-splits vs. other agreements.
We break up the data into three separate blocks: rst we only present BC
treatments, then IA-treatments including all observations, and then we show
data for IA-treatments restricted to only subjects who did what they agreed
on.
In the BC-treatments (see the top panel of Table 4), high frequencies of
equal-splits support versions (ii) and (iv) of the Assumption 3.26 In partic-
ular, data from BC-0 convincingly reject versions (i) and (iii) that predict
all ys at 10. In fact, there is only a single y = 10 in the data. However,
one may be wondering whether the four cases in BC-5 where y > 15 exert
25We discuss these selshand semi-honestsubjects further in section 3.5.
26Recall, this is supporting the classical notion of deal-me-out.
22
Table 4: Agreements
BC-treatments
Treat. y < 15 y = 15 y > 15
BC-0 1 22 1
BC-5 1 20 4
IA-treatments: All data
Treat. y < 15 y = 15 y > 15
IA-0 3 21 0
IA-5 0 18 8
IA-treatments: Honest subjescts (y = z)
y < 15 y = 15 y > 15
IA-0 0 17 0
IA-5 0 11 5
signicant pull on the distribution. We cannot reject the equality of the two
y-distributions in BC-treatments (two-sided Fishers exact test has p-value
= 0:58).
When it comes to IA-treatments (the middle panel of Table 4) we again
observe distinct patterns in the data. Two observations are the key to testing
various versions of the Assumption 3.
Observation 1: In both IA-treatments, we notice large frequencies of
equal splits, y = 15. In IA-0 the share is 86% and in IA-5 it is 69%.
Observation 2: Deviations from the equal split (either y < 15 or
y > 15) are signicantly di¤erent between the two treatments. There
are three such cases in IA-0 (12.5% of the sample agreed on y < 15) and
eight opposite cases in IA-5 (30.7% of the sample agreed on y > 15). We
can reject the equality of the two y-distributions in the IA-treatments
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at 1% level (two-sided Fishers exact test has p-value = 0:001).27
Those observations have the following implications for versions (i)-(iv) of
the Assumption 3:
Assumption 3(i) is inconsistent with Observation 1. Generating such
high frequencies of equal splits in both treatments would require a
large group of subjects in IA-0 with a B for which 5 = B(15) and
another large group of subjects in IA-5 with a di¤erent B for which
0 = B(15). This is inconsistent with participants having comparable
underlying characteristics across treatments. Moreover, in IA-5 this
violates monotonicity of B.
Assumption 3(ii) is inconsistent with both Observations 1 and 2. The
last argument of the previous case applies here as well. To explain the
high shares of equal splits in both treatments we would need to have
large proportions of subjects in both treatments with Bs for which
0 = B(15); this would violate the monotonicity assumption on B. But
perhaps this argument is too strict. It could be that B is indeed quite
at and instead of agreeing on predicted y = 16 or 17 subjects naturally
gravitate toward 15, despite the positive temptation costs. But if Bs
are rather at, then the distributions of ys in the two IA-treatments
should be the same. This is rejected by Observation 2.
Assumption 3(iii) is inconsistent with Observation 1. In IA-0, A3(iii)
predicts that all data be concentrated at y = 10 unless Bs are steep
enough so that y = 10 < B(30  y), i.e., E(iii) is empty. In that case
the agreement could be any y 2 fB(30  y); :::; 20g. The theory does
not specify any particular y from this set so it is safe to assume that as
long as 15 is included, it would be picked as the focalagreement. The
fact that there is just one agreement at y = 10 indicates that for most
27If one runs a test on just the observations for which y 6= 15, the results are virtually
the same. For BC-distributions the p-value is 0:524, for IA-distributions it is 0:006.
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subjects Bs are steep enough so that B(30 y) > 10. This, however,
implies that B(30 y)+5 > 15, and so in IA-5 most agreements should
be compensated: y > 15. Although, there is a signicant number of
compensated agreements, the frequency of equal splits is too high to
be in line with this prediction.
Assumption 3(iv) is (largely) consistent with both Observations 1 and
2, and organizes the data quite well. It predicts an equal split in both
IA-treatments if B is not very steep (so that the strict gains constraint
is slack). Otherwise, for steep Bs (such that the strict gains constraint
would be violated at the equal split), E(iv) is empty and agreements are
predicted to compensate players B, i.e., y > 15. This is more likely to
happen in the IA-5 than in IA-0, hence, if there are any compensated
agreements we would expect that they are more frequent in IA-5 than
in IA-0. This is indeed the observed pattern. Taking a further step
and restricting attention to those subjects in the position of player B
who did what they agreed on i.e., who were the revealed honest in
the bottom part of Table 4, we nd the same qualitative pattern and
a signicant di¤erence between the two frequency distributions of ys
(two-sided Fishers exact test28 has p-value = 0:018).29
Square deals
The data in the BC-treatments are consistent with versions (ii) and (iv)
of Assumption 3, and the data in IA-treatments with version (iv). Conse-
quently, we nd that the overall evidence supports version (iv). It deserves
28Applying Fishers test to sample restriction is not without caveats as marginals are no
longer exogenous by design. Subjects selected into the restricted sample, making Fishers
test more conservative. In our case, we can reject at a high signicance level even despite
this potential issue.
29There are three deviations from equal split in IA-0 that go in the wrong direction
(y < 15 instead of predicted y > 15). Notice however that all those agreements were
broken; B reneged, violating our (extreme) assumption of honesty.
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a nice name, indicating how the notions of honesty and equity shape an
informal agreement. We baptize any deal satisfying the combination of As-
sumptions 1, 2, and 3(iv) a square deal. According to dictionaries, square
can mean straightforward and honestas well as (in math) that all sides
are equal. Since we predict, and nd, that many players are honest and
that many deals involve straightforward equal splits, the terminology seems
appropriate.
We hope future research will test square-deal predictions in other games.
In this connection, we have a comment to add: So far we emphasized how
the solution (often) involves a particular equal split. Another interpretation
is feasible though. Perhaps a square deal is best thought of not as a theory
of splitting gains but rather as a theory based on focal points? Splitting
monetary gains, rather than overall gains (that include temptation costs),
would be focal. This idea connects to a line of thought that goes back to
Thomas Schelling. In two intriguing recent papers, Isoni, Poulsen, Sugden
& Tsutsui (2013, 2014) discuss Schellings (1960) idea that outcomes under
tacit bargaining (where communication is incomplete or impossible) as well
as binding contracts may depend on focal points which in turn may depend on
cues such as object proximity, existing location of bargaining parties, salience
of geographical boundaries (e.g., a river), precedence of supply chains, or a
historical consumer base. Isoni et al. experimentally test Schellings theory
and nd some support. We suggest that these ideas naturally extend beyond
tacit bargaining and bargaining with binding contracts, to explicit haggling
and informal agreements, which is our main focus. It would seem an ex-
citing long-run goal to merge the ideas of Schelling + Isoni et al. with our
framework, although in this paper we focus on a simpler norm which may
nevertheless be very relevant in many contexts (that perhaps lack salient
locations, rivers, or historical antecedents): 50/50 splits.30
30Andreoni & Bernheim (2009, p. 1607) reference a variety of studies documenting
prevalence of equal splits of dollar gains (e.g., joint ventures between corporations, share
tenancy in agriculture, bequests to children, negotiation and arbitration, business partners
splitting earnings from joint projects, or friends splitting tabs).
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3.4 No Negotiation
Are outcomes the same with and without pre-play negotiation? In order to
perform clean tests, we ran additional lost wallet games without pre-play
negotiation: NN-0 and NN-5. For each of our four original treatments, we
ask:
Q1: Does the proportion of In-choices by A players di¤er relative
to the corresponding NN-setting?
Q2: Does the distribution of B playerschoices (zs) di¤er rela-
tive to the corresponding NN-setting?
A priori one may be skeptical of Q2s relevance. Conceivably, pre-play
negotiation could select a biased sample of B players whose paired A players
chose In. Such bias is obviously ruled out in NN-0 and NN-5. However, this
worry is overcome because, in our data with pre-play negotiation, almost all
As chose In (the single exception occurred in IA-0). Pre-play negotiations
virtually did not restrict which Bs got to move.
To answer Q1 we run Fishers exact tests based on proportions of In-
choices, distilled from Table 2 and reported in Table 5. To answer Q2 we run
Mann-Whitney tests based on entire distributions of z-choices, given in Table
2 whereas in Table 5 we report only averages. Table 5 reports the p-values
of two-sided tests of the relevant null nypotheses of no treatment e¤ect.31 As
seen, with the exception of the Q1-tests involving NN-5, where the proportion
of In-choices is very high even without negotiation (23=25 = 0:92), most tests
deliver signicant di¤erences at conventional levels.32
31One-sided tests (of the hypotheses that there is more giving and more In-choices in
the IA- and BC-treatments than in the NN-treatments) reduce the p-values further (e.g.,
Mann-Whitney cuts them in half).
32One might furthermore ask (as a referee did) whether models where players pref-
erences depend only on the distribution of material payo¤s (e.g., inequity aversion) can
capture the observed subject behavior in our experiment? If so, the answer to Q2 should
be no, which however is not the case as can be seen from our results.
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Table 5: Hypotheses regarding the outcomes of play
Q1: Q2:
Test Proportion In p-value Average of zs p-value
IA-0 vs. NN-0 0.96 vs. 0.65 0.011 16.87 vs. 19.71 0.084
IA-5 vs. NN-5 1.00 vs. 0.92 0.226 18.41 vs. 21.35 0.031
BC-0 vs. NN-0 1.00 vs. 0.65 0.002 15.17 vs. 19.71 0.001
BC-5 vs. NN-5 1.00 vs. 0.92 0.226 16.19 vs. 21.35 0.000
3.5 Additional Observations
We close this section by briey discussing three systematic and intriguing
patterns in the data that are either at odds with or not explicitly predicted
by any of the models discussed so far.
Reneging and semi-honesty
Our rst comment belongs to subjects who reneged but did not keep
all 30. Such behavior lies outside the tight boundaries of our theoretical
model. It is not easy to judge whether these subjects acted in an honest or a
dishonest manner. On one hand, they did break the agreement; on the other
hand, they still showed concern for their respective player As by sending
them some money. Perhaps one might refer to them as semi-honest.
What should we think of their behavior? In IA-0 three pairs negotiated
agreements in which players B were supposed to keep y = 0; 10; and 13.
However, each of the B players reneged by shadingthe agreed-on amount
by some fraction and keeping z = 15; 20; and 18, respectively. It seems as
if these semi-honest Bs had di¤erent terms in mind ones where 30 > y 
15.33 The remaining data are in line with this story. In IA-5 we observe
eight agreements compensating Bs but this time only three of them reneged
33One of our referees suggested that guilt aversion (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007)
might play a role, while noting that it would take a modied version such that Bs guilt
were convex in how much A is hurt relative to his expectations.
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(y = 16; 17; 24 and z = 20; 15; 22 respectively). Each of the three subjects
gave his matched player A a positive amount. In two of those cases B actually
gave A more money than what they agreed on!
The selsh fringe
Next let us examine the behavior of player B subjects who kept all 30 for
themselves. Only ve subjects fall into this category. It might nevertheless
be interesting to look at their negotiation patterns. If their behavior was
planned, then they knew at the point of the agreement that they were going
to renege. One would think that their main objective would then be to
maximize the chances that their paired player A chooses In. What is the
most likely behavior to do the job?
All ve Bs in question ended up agreeing on an equal split. Three of
them accepted the opening equal split proposals made by their respective
As. One of them proposed an equal split which was accepted. And the last
one initially proposed 25 for himself but that was rejected and countered
with an equal split. This proposal was accepted by B.
Beware of people who do not goof around! The selsh fringe hide among
the subjects who strike 50/50 deals. We nd it intriguing that there seem to
be conformity in the community of condence tricksters. An analogous nd-
ing, for a di¤erent strategic setting with asymmetric information, is reported
by Charness & Dufwenberg (2011; see Section III.C)
Bargaining delay
Our next remark concerns a systematic pattern of bargaining delay. Most
of the time the parties agree quickly, but in almost all instances where the
negotiating proceeds several rounds this happens in the BC-treatments and
involves a player who demands more than 15. In Table 6 we list the se-
quences of proposal exchange for all deals that gave player B more money in
treatments BC-5 and IA-5. BC-5 agreements that favored player B (y > 15)
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involved a struggle between the paired subjects, with one pair negotiating as
long as fteen rounds! By contrast, similar agreements in IA-5 were settled
easily with only a few rounds of o¤er-exchange. We nd a similar pattern
for other departures from equal split in BC-0 and IA-0 (see Table 7 which
presents data on the length of negotiations broken down by nal agreement
y). Agreements that depart from equal splits in the BC-treatments were hard
bargains while this is not the case in the IA-treatments.
Table 6: Sequences of proposals
IA-5 BC-5
Obs: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4
Op. Prop.: B B A A B B A A B B B B
Rnd: 1 16 20 17 18 16 20 20 24 20 20 20 20
2 15 18 15 15 15
3 18 17 18 20
4 16 16 16 10
5 18 20
6 17 15
7 18 20
8 15 15
9 18 20
10 16 15
11 18 20
12 17 15
13 18 20
14 Out
15 17
Agreem.: 16 16 17 18 18 20 20 24 16 17 20 20
Note: Row opening proposal(Op. Prop:) lists the player (A or B) who opened the
negotiations. Sequences of proposal-exchange run from top to bottom; e.g., sequence 2 in
IA-5 reads as follows: player B made the rst proposal to keep 20; player A countered
with 15; player B rejected this and suggested he keeps 18; then player A went up to 16;
and this was accepted by player B.
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Why do we observe this bargaining delay with binding agreements but
not with informal agreements? Our intuition is as follows: Agreements that
are predicted by the theory incorporate a certain fairness standard, which
makes them legitimate proposals. In BC-treatments an equal-split is the
only legitimate agreement and hence the only legitimate proposal to make.
Insisting on y 6= 15 should lead to conict and bargaining delay. In IA-
treatments, these o¤ers could be justied based on subjectsdi¤erent Bs.
Therefore, the terms favoring one of the subjects might be more easily agreed
upon.
Table 7: Average length (rounds) of negotiations
IA-0 IA-5 BC-0 BC-5
y = 15 1.048 1.5 1.818 1.55
(0.218),{21} (0.985),{18} (1.79),{22} (1.791),{20}
y 6= 15 1.667 1.556 4.5 7
(1.155),{3} (1.014),{9} (2.121),{2} (6.52),{5}
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses; number of observations are in braces; two
cases in BC-5 where subjects failed to reach an agreement are excluded.
There are multiple ways of evaluating this conjecture. One is in terms of
the length of negotiations. Table 7 provides clear support for the argument
suggested above. The average length of negotiations (number of rounds of
o¤er-exchange) for proposals that cannot be easily justied (in the pooled
data from BC-treatments when y 6= 15) is distinctly longer, 4.5-7 rounds,
than for all other proposals (in the pooled data from the remaining treat-
ments), 1.048-1.818.34
Another way of looking at the same issue is by comparing acceptance
rates for the initial proposals.35 Table 8 gives the summary of the data.
The acceptance rate for initial proposals that are di¢ cult to justify (y 6= 15
34The di¤erence in distributions is statistically signicant; p = 0:000 on an Epps-
Singleton test.
35Only for the initial o¤ers we are guaranteed to have independent observations.
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Table 8: Acceptance rates of initial proposals
IA-0 IA-5 BC-0 BC-5
Op. proposal = 15 20/20 13/15 14/15 16/17
100% 86.7% 93.3% 94.1%
Op. proposal 6= 15 2/4 6/12 0/9 1/10
50% 50% 0% 10%
in BC-treatments) is signicantly lower (0-10%) than for the rest of the
opening proposals ( 50%).36 Equal split proposals clearly attract the higher
acceptance rate ( 86%). This suggests that departures from equal splits
in the BC-treatments are typically viewed as unjustied, and so become
hard bargains. The resulting deals are then likely driven by an imbalance in
subjectspatience and obstinacy.
4 Discussion
Informal agreements have been given scant attention in economic theory. Are
they unimportant? Couldnt agents rather rely on binding contracts? We do
not think so for several reasons.
First, e¤ective binding contracts may be infeasible. Consider two impa-
tient shermen in a developing country where neither courts nor enforcement
are reliable. It may be close to impossible to legally enforce a contract which
regulates access to a nearby lake. Does this doom the shermen to excessive
depletion of the sh stock? Even if the interaction is repeated, classical the-
ory would say yes (because of the impatience). According to our theory, the
answer may be no, if the shermen rely on an informal agreement.
Dixit (2004) discusses countries and settings where contract enforcement
is lacking,37 and explores how informal agreements must be enforced by other
36This di¤erence is statistically signicant Fishers exact test has p-value = 0:000.
37For example, he refers to Bearak (2000) who reports that there are 25 million cases
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means, including repetition, third-party enforcement, information exchange,
and social norms of punishment. The notion that people may (to a degree)
simply be honest complements his perspective.
Second, binding contracts may be illegal. Think of collusion in a one-shot
government procurement auction in industrial countries. Courts exist, police
can be relied on, yet bid rigging is illegal. Does that imply that the outcome
will be as competitive as standard auction theory suggests? Perhaps not.
Suppose rm representatives meet in a bar, have a pint, shake hands, and
agree to collude. If they act as in our theory, their deal may stick.
Third, even if binding contracts are feasible in principle (as they perhaps
usually are) they may be costly. A man meets a woman and they play
the (one-shot, sequential) game of life with decisions on having kids, who
works, divorce, alimony, etc. A binding contract may involve signicant costs
ranging from lawyersfees to unforeseen contingencies to awkward feelings
regarding legal chit-chat during courtship. Perhaps, instead, the couple shun
the formalities, look one another in the eye, promise to be faithful forever?
Building on classical notions from the literature on binding contracts,
we developed and tested four models of informal agreement formation for
honest agents. All models fared well in that agreements formed and the
degree of subsequent honesty was rather large. Only one theory, which we
(in section 3.3) named the square deal solution, captured the following two
key data features: the preponderance of agreements involve 50/50 splits of
the total monetary gains and a fraction of struck deals deviate from 50/50
in a particular direction to favor the party who is most tempted to renege.
Our experiment is but an initial test. For example, one interesting further
test (suggested by a referee) could relate to whether temptation costs (i(a))
are strictly convex in stakes. If so, if one could increase the stakes, say by
factor of 10, temptations would increase disproportionally. In lost wallet
games, once player B gets to move, the temptation to renege (and take all
pending before the courts in India, and even if no new ones are led, it will take 324 years
to clear the backlog.
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10 $30 = $300) may be unbearable (i.e., incompatible with the strict gains
condition). The testable implication would be that subjects should strike
compensated deals (that favor B) more frequently.
The square deal solution, as we dened it, is applicable rather generally.
We leave for the future further exploration of a variety of games, and broader
economic modeling. In this connection, let us note several issues to keep in
mind: First, our framework may be adequate for exploring endogenously in-
complete contractswhere parties elect to regulate only some choices through
binding contracts. Second, we have restricted attention to settings where we
could disregard moral hazard. The advantage was that we could highlight
how for honest bargaining parties a key di¤erence between informal agree-
ments and binding contracts concerns the relative presence of temptation
costs, and the way these may shape deals. However, settings with moral haz-
ard are tremendously important and should be studied too. If this were done,
one would be lead to consider combinations of binding contracts (for choices
that can be monitored and enforced) and informal agreements (for choices
that cannot be monitored or enforced) and temptation costs may then bear
on the latter choices.38 Third, our theories assume that agreements would
be universally honored. In our data honesty was commonplace, but not uni-
versal. Addressing heterogeneity in honesty may be doable and worthwhile.
Fourth, we limited attention to games with two players, but many situations
involve multiple bargaining parties. Fifth, in many contexts material costs
and revenues are not as readily observable as our above account (with given
mi functions) may suggest. For example, how should considerations of un-
observed cost-of-e¤ort or consumer surplus be dealt with? Sixth, even when
dollar payo¤s are given, 50=50 splits may not be focal in all settings and a
rened theory may consider alternatives (recall our remarks in section 3.3,
related to the important work of Isoni et al.).
38This would seem relevant for example to the setting studied by Hart & Moore (2008),
involving consummate performancewhich is the part of a partys e¤ort that cannot be
agreed on in a binding manner. It seems natural to imagine that parties would communi-
cate and strike informal agreements about such choices.
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We hope our paper will stimulate more work theory & experiments 
on the selection, shape, and impact of informal agreements.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Additional information
Table 9: Treatments
Name Type of Agreement Outside Opt. Sessions # of subj.
IA-0 Informal (10,0) 1 20
IA-0 Informal (10,0) 2 28
IA-5 Informal (5,5) 3 28
IA-5 Informal (5,5) 4 26
BC-0 Binding (10,0) 5 & 6 10
BC-0 Binding (10,0) 7 28
BC-5 Binding (5,5) 8 30
BC-5 Binding (5,5) 9 24
NN-0 No negotiations (10,0) 10 & 11 18
NN-0 No negotiations (10,0) 12 16
NN-5 No negotiations (5,5) 13 22
NN-5 No negotiations (5,5) 14 18
NN-5 No negotiations (5,5) 15 10
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics
Tr. Obs. Agreement Decisions
Agreed Pl. A: In Pl. B: y Pl. A: In Pl. B: y
(%) (%) (st. dev.) (%) (st. dev.)
IA-0 24 24 24 14.08 23 16.13
(100) (100) (3.19) (96) (5.65)
IA-5 26 26 25 16.11 26 18.54
(100) (96) (2.321) (100) (4.99)
BC-0 24 24 24 15.17 24 15.17
(100) (100) (1.05) (100) (1.05)
BC-5 27 25 25 15.48 25 15.48
(93) (100) (1.45) (100) (1.45)
NN-0 25 - - - 17 19.71
(65) (6.11)
NN-5 26 - - - 23 21.35
(92) (5.26)
Note: In IA-0 one pair has agreed that player A chooses Out. Following this player A
chose In and player B kept 15. In only two instances, both in BC-5, subjects have
disagreed. In both cases player As chose In, player Bs kept 20 and 30 respectively.
5.2 Instructions
In what follows we present the universal version of the instructions in which
{... or ...} always contains two di¤erent versions of the text that was used
appropriately in di¤erent treatments.
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk with
each other for the duration of the experiment. If you have a question after we
nish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter
will approach you and answer your question in private.
You will receive $5 for participating in this experiment. You may also re-
ceive additional money, depending on the choices made (as described below).
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash individually and privately.
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no
participant will ever know the identity of the person he or she is paired with.
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In the experiment, one person from each pair will be randomly selected
to be Player A and the other to be Player B. The players will interact in
two stages: 1. The Negotiation Stage and 2. The Game. In the negotiation
stage the players can form an agreement about how to play the game. Any
agreement reached in the negotiation stage {will or will not} be enforced
and the players {will have to play according to the agreement or be free to
make any decisions} in the game that follows. The decisions {in the game or
in the negotiation stage} will determine how much each of the players earns
in the experiment.
We next describe rst the game and then the negotiation stage that pre-
cedes it.
The Game
Player A moves rst and chooses either IN or OUT by clicking a button
labeled either INor OUT.
Player B moves second:
 If Player A chose OUT, then the game ends. Player A receives {$5 or
$10} and Player B receives {$5 or $0} .
 If Player A chose IN, then Player B splits $30 between the two of them:
Player B keeps $x and gives $30   x to Player A, choosing x such that
$0  x  $30.
The Negotiation Stage
Before the game is played the players can form an agreement about how
to play the game. One player from each pair will be randomly selected to
make the rst proposal and the other player will be asked to respond to it.
A proposal describes the choices of Player A and Player B in the game.
It could be:
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Player A chooses OUT
or it could be
Player A chooses IN and
Player B keeps $x and gives $30 x to Player A.
The proposal is sent to the other player by clicking on the Submit
button. The responding player observes the proposal and chooses one of the
following three options:
 Agree with the proposal by clicking on the button Agree.In this case
an agreement is formed and {will or will not} be enforced.
 Make a counter-proposal by clicking on the button Make a counter-
proposal.This reverses the roles of the players in the negotiation. Now,
the player who clicked this button makes a new proposal and sends it to
the other player. The other player will then have the chance to respond
by either agreeing with the proposal, or making a counter-proposal, or
disagreeing.
 Disagree and quit negotiating by clicking on the button Disagree and
quit negotiating.In this case no agreement is reached and negotiations
terminate. Both players proceed to play the game.
Control Questions: (computerized, not part of paper instruc-
tions)
1. Select the correct answer. In the Game, after Player A chose IN,
a) Player B chooses how to split $30 between himself/herselfand
Player A.
b) the experiment ends.
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2. Select the correct answer. In the Negotiation Stage, if one player makes
a proposal and the other player agrees with it:
a) An agreement is made and both Player A and Player B will have
to play the game according to the agreement.
b) An agreement is made but both Player A and Player B will be
able to choose their actions in the game that follows.
4. Please type in the answer. In the game Player A chose IN and Player
B kept $30.
a) The payo¤ of Player A is: .........
b) The payo¤ of Player B is: .........
5. Please type in the answer. In the game Player A chose IN and Player
B kept $11.
a) The payo¤ of Player A is: .........
b) The payo¤ of Player B is: .........
6. Please type in the answer. In the game Player A chose IN and Player
B kept $0.
a) The payo¤ of Player A is: .........
b) The payo¤ of Player B is: .........
7. Please type in the answer. In the game Player A chose OUT.
a) The payo¤ of Player A is: .........
b) The payo¤ of Player B is: .........
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